The University of Maine

DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Fogler Library

Summer 8-23-2019

Understanding the Dynamics of Unclaimed Terrorism Events in
Pakistan: A Machine Learning Approach
Evan Christie
University of Maine, evan.christie@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Christie, Evan, "Understanding the Dynamics of Unclaimed Terrorism Events in Pakistan: A Machine
Learning Approach" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 3093.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/3093

This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.

UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF UNCLAIMED TERRORISM EVENTS IN PAKISTAN:
A MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH
By
Evan Christie
B.S. State University of New York Institute of Technology, 2008

A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in Global Policy)

The Graduate School
The University of Maine
August 2019

Advisory Committee:
Muhammad Asif Nawaz, Professor of History, Advisor
Kristin Vekasi, Professor of Political Science
Kate Beard-Tisdale, Professor of Spatial Information Science Engineering

Copyright 2019 Evan Christie

ii

UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF UNCLAIMED TERRORISM EVENTS IN PAKISTAN:
A MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH
By Evan Christie
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Muhammad Asif Nawaz

An Abstract of the Thesis Presented
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
(in Global Policy)
August 2019
Terrorists thrive on media coverage because it multiplies the effect of an attack
(Nacos, 2007). However, according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), only ten
percent of terrorist attacks have been attributed globally from 1970 to 2017 (START,
2017). If the media coverage is a prerequisite for a terrorist group’s survival, the lack of
attributed attacks in the world is puzzling. This thesis examines the phenomenon of
unattributed terrorist attacks using Pakistan as a case study. Pakistan is used as a case
study because the percentage of claimed terrorist attacks in Pakistan closely resembles the
global average of the lack of attribution of terrorist attacks – only fifteen percent of attacks
are attributed in Pakistan. By using different organizational attributes – like attack, target,
weapon preferences, spatial attack data, and lethality of attacks, this study attempts to
match unattributed terror attacks to known groups.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), claimed terrorist attacks have
reduced over the last few years. Attacks are cheap and easy to claim and have a multiplying
effect on the attack which provides benefits to the terrorist organization (Nacos, 2007). Yet,
the GTD shows only 15 percent of global attacks have been claimed which suggests the
claiming of attacks may not be as important to the act of terrorism as suggested by Nacos.
Even so, a compelling argument has been made my Kearns et al (2014) that suggests
that attributions of attacks are significant and terrorist attacks should be studied in a way
that goes beyond the binary notion of unclaimed versus claimed (Kearns et al, 2014). Their
argument is supported by LaFree, Dylan, and Miller’s argument that even without claims
many attacks are attributed (LaFree, Dylan, and Miller, 2015) to different groups using
characteristics of the groups. The GTD corroborates this by having 28 percent of the
recorded attacks attributed to groups. The remainder of the attacks, however, are
unclaimed and unattributed.
Even with the abundance of literature on terrorist organizational behavior and
terrorist attacks, there are few scholars researching claimability. Fewer still research
attribution, yet, the most common question after an attack is “Who did it?”. The dearth of
studies concerning claims and attributions likely prevents many studies from reaching
their full explanatory ability.
Because most attacks go unclaimed, it is important to maximize the number of
attacks that are attributed. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the current literature. By doing
so, it will allow more robust studies on organizational lifespan, organizational behavior,
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and further the study of attribution of terrorist attacks to name a few examples.
Additionally, this thesis will help further predict the perpetrators of attacks in Pakistan by
using the group characteristics as indicated in historical attack data which has been
collected by the GTD.
This thesis addresses the lack of attributed attacks in the GTD by creating an
artificial neural network that leverages the data detailed in the GTD to make its own
attribution predictions for unattributed terror attacks. The next section of this thesis
covers the existing literature on claimability of terrorism followed by a discussion of
artificial neural networks and how they are used. The following chapter covers the
methodology of this study and details the data used and the specific details regarding the
use of the artificial neural network as it pertains to this study. Subsequently, the next
chapter is the analysis of the generated models and their accuracy and confidence after
which will be a conclusion suggesting potential further areas of study and alternatives to
make further study of attribution more successful.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, I first review a brief history of Pakistan. Then, I explore why some
terrorist groups claim attacks, and examine the associated costs and benefits of doing so.
Following this is an examination of current scholarship discussing how unclaimed attacks
tend to go unclaimed when the costs outweigh the benefits. Next, I discuss how groups are
able to be identified by their activities and how the attributes of a group can be used to
make predictions about the groups. Finally, this chapter discusses the artificial neural
network which is a technique used to take descriptive data and make classifications from
the data.
2.1. A Brief History of Pakistan
Pakistan’s efforts to survive as a country has been turbulent and filled with
uncertainty (Ahmed, 1996). Despite that most of the Pakistani population is Muslim,
Pakistan is composed of overwhelmingly diverse ethnic and linguistic groups which
strongly identify themselves with their own ethnic groups. Major ethnic groups in Pakistan
consist of Sindhis, Punjabis, Pashtuns, Muhajirs, Baloch, Kashmiris, Bengalis, Brahuis, and
Saraikis and there are a few other minor ethnic groups. While English and Urdu are
Pakistan’s official languages, Pakistan has over 20 regional languages that are spoken by
different ethnic groups. The most popularly spoken languages are Punjabi, Saraiki, Pashto,
Sindhi, Balochi, Kashmiri among several other minority languages.
This divergence of peoples and language groups in Pakistan was one of the critical
driving reasons that the country has been struggling to achieve a strong sense of
nationalism given tension among ethnic groups continues to exist. When President
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Iskandar Mirza led a military mobilization in 1958 and appointed General Ayub Kahn as
Commander in chief, Pakistan was ruled by military rulers until 1971. In 1971 under
President Yahya Khan, Pakistani Armed forces from West Pakistan led the suppression of
East Pakistan and began genocide against Bengali (BBC, 2019). It became a full-scale civil
war in Pakistan later known as the Bangladesh Liberation War. At the end of the war, East
Pakistan became a separate country, current day’s Bangladesh. After the Bangladesh
Liberation War, Pakistan experiences two more military eras (from 1977 to 1988 and from
1999 to 2007) and two more democratic eras (from 1988 to 1999 and 2008 to present).
Currently, Pakistan government is ruled by Prime Minister Imran Khan.
It is rare to find countries that are not ethnically heterogeneous. However, Pakistan
is a country with ethnic, linguistic, religious diversity and the diversity in the country
affected negatively on the establishment of high levels of polity and the security of the
country. During 72 years of its history, Pakistan has been affected by conflicts caused by
ethnic discord (Majeed, 2010). The conflicts in Pakistan range from territorial conflict
between different ethnic groups to violent extremist groups in the country perpetrating
attacks targeting civilians or military.
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Figure 2.1. Ethnic Groups in Pakistan
Source: The University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at
Austin

As Figure 2.1. shows, Pakistan is composed of various ethnic groups. This ethnic
heterogeneity led Pakistan to emerge as a country but failed to create nationalism (Jahan,
1972, as cited in Majeed, 2010) causing ethnic, and religious conflicts, on the basis of
language, territoriality, and Caste (Majeed, 2010). In many cases, ethnic diversity led to
competitiveness within the country among the groups (Smallbone, Kitching, & Athayde,
2010) in development of the region, representations in the government, sovereignty,
allocation of resources, inter-province migration, and language and culture identity issues
(Ahmed, 1996). For example, since Pakistan is composed of many linguistic groups,
language is one of the ways that people identify themselves as a certain ethnic group.
Suppression of Bengalis and the central government’s policy to prohibit Bengalis to speak
their language led to the separation of East Pakistan in 1971.
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Violence and insecurity that are related to ethnic fractionalization are most
prevalent in Sindh and Balochistan regions. The regions’ economic demographic, social,
political, and cultural trends have been shifting in consequences of ethnic clashes between
ethnic groups and the central Pakistani government (Ahmed, 1996). In 1972, riots broke
out in Sindh region against the central government which forced Sindhi people to speak
Urdu. This demonstration led the central government to make Sindhi one of the official
languages in Sindh region (Majeed, 2010).
In Balochistan, independence movements have been popular since 1947 when
Balochi people were forcefully merged into Pakistan by the Pakistani ruling class (Laif and
Hamza, 2009). Since 1972, Baloch politicians have been struggling to secure higher political
positions in the majority of Urdu speaking central government (Majeed, 2010).
Furthermore, when Pakistan discovered a natural gas depository as a source of energy,
Balochistan was not able to get benefit from the gas pipeline, and to today still have
minimum access (Laif and Hamza, 2009).
Ethnic conflict based on territory is most prominent conflict in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region.
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Figure 2.2. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
Source: United States Institute of Peace

FATA is a territory covering about 27,500 square kilometers along the border
between northwest Pakistan and southeast Afghanistan. This region is home to over 3.5
million Pashtun tribesmen and about 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan (Nawaz, S.,
2009). FATA has been a region of instability because of stronger ethnic identity than
national identity. FATA zone was created in the 1800’s by India’s British colonial rulers
when they realized that they were not able to control the mountainous region and its tribes
militarily (Rupert, 2018). The British ended up letting the tribesmen rule themselves with
an option to intervene if they acted against British colonizers’ wills. As a result of this,
ethnic Pashtun people who are religiously mostly Muslim, have been living in FATA at the
border of Pakistan and Afghanistan loosely living by the British colonial laws. Since the end
of colonial period, Pakistan has ruled FATA region through a mix of British colonial laws,
military power, and government appointed representatives who receive the authority to
rule the region (Abbas, 2014; Rupert, 2018).
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Because of Pakistan’s unique juxtaposition of ethnic groups, the country has been
struggling to establish a strong rule of law and to keep the society stable. Instability of the
country has been shown throughout the history of Pakistan as we discussed in conflicts in
FATA region, secession of Bangladesh, and conflicts in Sindh and Baluchistan. However,
internal conflicts are not the only reasons that cause instability in Pakistan. Pakistan has
been home to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Taliban. It became more obvious and
known to the public that Pakistan has been involved in terrorism when the United States
caught Osama bin Laden and assassinated him (Weinbaum, 2014).
The history of terrorism in Pakistan existed more than three decades ago, rather
than abruptly triggered after the 9/11 like many other terrorist attacks in the middle east.
The origin of Pakistani militant groups started as a method to counter the Soviet influence
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. To limit the spread of Soviet
ideology in South Asia, American and Pakistani intelligence agencies supported the
Mujahideen, who fights against non-Muslim forces (Yusuf, 2014). During this process, the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border was not strictly monitored to allow militants to move across
the border and conduct operations in Afghanistan. However, the freedom of controlling the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which is the FATA, led to more severe instability within
Pakistan after 9/11.
The FATA region has been the most contested territory between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Pashtuns are the majority of the population in FATA; about 15 million
Pashtuns live in Afghanistan while 25 million live in Pakistan along the Durand Line1
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Durand Line is the 2,640-kilometer border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is the
result of an agreement between Sir Montimer Durand, a secretary of the British Indian
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(Nawaz, S., 2009; Tajik, 2014). Since the Pashtuns were separated by the artificial border
drawn by the British, the people in FATA identify themselves as Pashtuns instead of Afghan
or Pakistani. Furthermore, due to the poor border security in the FATA, it has been easy for
Afghan Taliban leaders to recruit soldiers from Pashtuns. Taliban leaders used this tactic
after the US invasion of Afghanistan to fight the outside forces (Nawaz, S., 2009). In an
effort to monitor the border and minimize the effects of Taliban getting into Pakistan,
Pakistan government launched a mission called “Operation Meezan.” Although its purpose
was to stop the influx of Pashtuns living on Afghanistan side of FATA to Pakistan, Pakistan
military was told not to engage with Afghan Taliban and only arrest the others such as alQaeda members from Central Asia and other Arab countries (Haider, 2014; Nawaz, A.,
2018). Because of communication issues between Pakistan government and the military,
the operation ended in failure. Pakistan’s effort to bring stability in the country and
establish security has not been successful. Currently, there are still numerous terrorist
groups operating within Pakistan and along the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In this thesis, I chose Pakistan as a case study for two reasons. First, Pakistan has
many cases of active terrorist activities so there are a lot of data available to study from.
Second, the trends of terrorism in Pakistan resembles the global terrorism trends which is
represented in the Global Terrorism Database that I will use as the major data source in
this thesis. Figure 2.3 shows the number of attacks and the number of kills by terrorist

government, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the emir, or ruler, of Afghanistan. The agreement
was signed on November 12, 1893, in Kabul, Afghanistan. The British established the
Durand Line after conquering the Pashtuns. 85% of the Durand Line follows the rivers and
other physical features, not ethnic boundaries. It split the Pashtuns into two separate
countries, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Schons, 2011).
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attack on a global scale from 1970 to 2018. We observe a fluctuation in the number of
attacks and the number of kills by year from 1970 to 2009, and there is a sharp increase in
the attacks and kills after 2010. Figure 2.4 shows the number of attacks and the number of
kills by terrorist groups by year in Pakistan from 1970 to 2018. As we see in the global
trend, the same trend occurs in Pakistan; there is a fluctuation in the number of attacks and
the number of kills by year from 1970 to 2009, and we see a sharp increase after 2010.
Since both global terrorism trend and the trend in Pakistan significantly resemble each
other, the analysis on Pakistan will later be possible to generalize on the global terrorism
trend.
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Figure 2.3. Global Trend: Number of Attacks and Number of Kills by Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
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Figure 2.4. Pakistan Trend: Number of Attacks and Number of Kills by Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database

2.2. Why Groups Claim Attacks
There are a number of reasons why terrorist organizations claim attacks.
Fundamentally, the definition of terrorism requires an attack to speak to a larger audience
than the immediate victims of the attack itself and is in pursuit of a greater overall goal
(Richards, 2014). If the intention of terrorist attacks is to speak to a larger audience as is
common among most definitions of terrorism, then claiming attacks becomes the most
effective way of spreading the message and is often done through media outlets. These
media outlets then sensationalize the attack and the messaging behind giving greater
attention to the perpetrators of attacks (Barnett & Reynolds, 2009). Nacos (2007) argues
that “the inevitable and primary role of communication and propaganda is the terrorist
design and the contemporary mass media’s appetite to facilitate the need of virtually all
terrorists to have their deeds publicized.”
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While the media is used to spread the message for the terrorist organizations, the
message is used for the following reasons: competition among terrorist organizations,
signaling strength, ideology, religion, and state retaliation (Wright, 2009).
For instance, intergroup competition among terrorist organizations sometimes dictates the
decisions to claim or not claims attacks. The intergroup competition among terrorist
organizations depicts situations in which there are multiple terrorist organizations all
vying for the same resources (these resources being both monetary as well as masses of
people who represent potential recruits). Hoffman (2010) argues when the number of
terrorist organizations increases, the more difficult it is for actual perpetrators to
distinguish themselves from groups that had not participated (Hoffman, 2010). To
distinguishing themselves from less active gr5oups, terrorist organizations use claimed
attacks to appeal to their audience to instill the idea they are the group to follow or
support.
The second reason for claiming terrorist attacks is signaling strength. The signaling
of strength is similar to competition among terrorist organizations with the exception that
the signals are intended for other outside audiences. Outside audiences can be rival
terrorist organizations, local and regional governments, or the pool of potential recruits for
the group. By claiming a successful terrorist attack against a military target the group is
able to project its power and tactical ability to not only its own audience but also as a
message to governments that the group is strong and capable enough to achieve its goals
(Kidd & Walter, 2006).
Claiming attacks can also increase the incitement for the ideological and religious
goals of the terrorist organization in the local public. They are used to appeal to the idea
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that the act of violence is intended to further the ideological or religious goals of the group.
In the case of religious motivations, the attack is done to benefit the religion and that it is
the right thing to do. Hoffman (2010) and Drake (1998) both suggest that ideology and
religion provide a motive and framework for terrorist organizations to act.
Lastly, claiming a terror attack is used to manipulate counter-terror responses from
both the local and international governments. There are different ways in which claiming
attacks affect counter-terror efforts. On one hand, terrorist organizations use the attacks in
order to provoke a violent counter-terror response. The result of which would be the
terrorist organization using the reprisal as a means of framing their conflict against an
‘oppressive government’ or ‘the west.’ On the other hand, eliciting a weak response from
the government would have a similar effect of signaling strength and reinforce the
organizations ability to provide better than the government. Still, terrorist organizations
sometimes claim attacks perpetrated by other groups with the intention to outbid and
increase the notoriety of the group (Kearns, Conlon, & Young, 2014).
These reasons for claiming attacks are represented by the strategic goals of
organizations through the categories of intimidation, attrition, spoiling, outbidding, and
provocation (Kidd & Walter, 2006). Intimidation represents the group’s ability to punish
and the local government’s inability to stop the violence. Attrition is the group expressing
its resolve by forcing itself and the government to pay higher costs (of life and material)
over time. Spoiling is the act of terrorist organizations creating doubt and mistrust between
two parties attempting to negotiate peace. Outbidding represents competition between
groups for limited resources. Lastly, provocation is used to cause the government to over-
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react whereby the population becomes alienated and the terrorists cause becomes more
appealing.
2.3. Why Groups Do Not Claim Attacks
Although claiming attacks yields benefits to terrorist organizations on certain
occasions, numerous costs are also associated with claiming attacks. This is due to the
organizational structure of terrorist groups. There is an assumption that the leadership of
organizations is rational actors and they are conducting cost–benefit analyses when
determining whether to claim an attack or not (Abrahms & Conrad, 2017). The core idea is
that if the political impact outweighs the risks, then the attack is claimed; otherwise, it is
not. For example, if a terrorist organization organized a bombing targeting occupation
forces and was successful in the attack with minimal casualties then the attack is likely to
be claimed. Conversely, if a similar attack is planned and many more innocent civilian
women and children are killed then the attack is unlikely to be claimed. Max Abrahams
elaborates on denial of organizational involvement. According to Abrahams, “many militant
leaders have been reluctant to claim credit for civilian attacks due to the expected political
fallout (Abrahams, 2018).” Abrahams uses the example of credit claiming by Taliban using
the GTD. His studies show that leaders are more likely to not claim the attacks if the victims
of the attacks are mostly civilians. Abrahams’ analysis shows that among all the claimed
attacks by Taliban, only 27% targeted civilians while 42% targeted government or military
(Abrahams, 2018). As we can see in this example, Taliban claimed attacks when the victims
were civilians who have politically influence. This phenomenon might be caused by the
characteristics of Taliban as a terrorist organization which started as a Sunni Islamic
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fundamentalist political movement. Post 1990’s, the Taliban had thousands of followers
which was much larger than any political parties in Afghanistan (Dorronsoro, 2002).
Applying Abrahams’ analogy of the chances of claiming attacks and the type of
victims, I conducted analyses on all terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

Figure 2.5. Civilian and GPM attacks
Comparison

Figure 2.5 shows the comparison between civilian and government, police, and
military (GPM) for number of attacks and the number of kills (lethality) of attacks. The
number of known and unknown attacks for civilian surpass the number of known and
unknown attacks for GPM attacks. Even though on average, civilians have been victims of
terrorist attacks compared to GPM, there is a higher number of unknown civilian attacks
than the attacks targeted at GPM. Therefore, Pakistan’s number of attacks by terrorist
groups follows Abrahams’ argument on why terrorist groups do not claim attacks when the
victims are civilians. On the number of kills, there are a greater number of kills for
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unknown attacks than known attacks when the victims were civilians. There are a greater
number of kills for known attacks than unknown attacks when the victims were GPM.
There is a discrepancy when applying Abrahams’ argument on less likelihood of
claiming attacks when civilians are the victims. The reasoning comes from the fact that
Abrahams uses claimed and unclaimed attacks while I use attributed and unattributed
attacks. The difference between a claimed attacks and attributed attacks is as follows:
claimed attacks are the ones that the perpetrating terrorist groups put out a formal media
coverage claiming the attacks. Attributed attacks are the ones that the perpetrating
terrorist group has been identified by a third party, such as multiple news organizations or
witnesses, that the attacks have been done by a particular terrorist group. Furthermore,
Abrahams uses the example of Taliban only while this thesis uses all terrorist attacks in
Pakistan as a sample. At a basic analysis level, the Pakistan example in this thesis agrees
with Abraham’s argument; when the civilians are targeted as victims of terrorist attacks, it
is less likely to be claimed and attributed. However, the reason that Taliban is less likely to
claim attacks targeted to civilians because they are politically influential needs to be
further examined in Pakistan example to fully understand why attacks are unattributed
when they are targeting civilians.
Scholars suggest that while the leadership of terrorist organizations is normally
synchronized and working towards the same goals, the regular members of the group are
much more heterogeneous (Kearns, Conlon, & Young, 2014). The nature of this
arrangement leads to the terrorist’s dilemma as presented by Shapiro (Shapiro, 2013). In
his book, The Terrorist’s Dilemma, he shows this dynamic between leadership and members
of the group where more control being exerted by the leadership over the members
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increases the risk of reprisal to the leadership of the group. Reprisals tend to come in the
form of leadership decapitations conducted through drone strikes in recent years. The
results of that introduce the concept of the principle-agent problem. The principle-agent
problem highlights a situation that reduced control and communication from the
leadership of terrorist organizations result in membership committing attacks and
targeting populations that do not advance the goals of the organization.
Furthermore, many terrorist attacks go unclaimed because the attacks have failed to
achieve their goal. Instead of signaling weakness, the attack goes unclaimed to prevent the
terrorist organization from looking bad. Related to this, changing dynamics in public
sentiment on the ground also has an impact on whether or not an attack is claimed. This
could be due to successes in counter-terrorism efforts or even unintended consequences of
attacks.
Regardless of the specific reasonings for whether an attack is claimed or not, the
disparity of claimed versus unclaimed attacks as a significant problem. As we can see in
Figure 2.6, the number of attacks that have been claimed globally is represented as only 9
percent while in Pakistan attacks are claimed 13 percent of the time.
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Figure 2.6. Global and Pakistan Claimed vs Unclaimed Attacks
(Data collected from the Global Terrorism Database)

With so much data concerning the claimed attacks missing from scholarly
knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to provide good counter-terrorism advice and
produce accurate studies on specific group behavior. This is the gap in the data this thesis
is attempting to fill.
According to Kearns, Conlon, and Young, each terrorist organization has a number of
habits, patterns, or calling cards that separate the group from others (Kearns, Conlon, &
Young, 2014).
2.4. Edge Cases: One Hit Wonders and Lone Wolfs
There are a couple of types of terrorist behaviors that will not be measurable
through this thesis, however, they are still relevant and must be addressed. The first type of
attack are attacks from typically smaller groups that only ever attack once or very rarely
known as one-hit wonders (Blomberg & Engel, 2010). The Blomberg and Engel study
shows that the majority of groups end up in this category; most groups commit between
one and five attacks overall.
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The second type of terrorism that this thesis won’t be able to account for are lone
wolf attacks. A lone wolf attack is where an individual, usually operates in their own
nation’s territory but separated from a terrorist organization, commits a terrorist attack
and the individual claims to represent a terrorist organization. Examples of this are the
multiple attacks in France and the San Bernardino shooting in the United States. Forster
and Hader cite the Brussels and San Bernardino attacks to explain the way homegrown
attacks increase operational security for the attack (Forster & Hader, 2016). This, in turn,
reduces the likelihood the attack will be discovered ahead of time. Consequently, due to the
nature of these types of attacks, there is often little attack data available or there are
extremely loose connections between the individuals perpetrating the attack and the
groups they claim to represent. Accepting the limitations of the edge cases, the Global
Terrorism Database provides ample data describing attacks within Pakistan.
2.5. Terrorist Groups and Characteristics
Terrorist groups have unique characteristics that distinguish each group from
others. They are fundamentally and strategically organized and operated differently from
traditional definitions of criminal behavior. By observing the differences and the traits of
terrorist groups, it is possible to sort out terrorist organizations. It is also possible to
identify specific terrorist organizations’ dependence on each group’s behaviors, goals, and
other characteristics they pursue.
To verify this claim, scholars have been studying ways to identify and classify
terrorist organizations. Post, Ruby, and Shaw explain that the features of terrorist groups
can and must be tailored to the type of organization, particular region or country involved
(Smith, Damphouse, & Roberts, 2006) (Post, Ruby, & Shaw, 2002) (Ullah, Hussain, & Sajid,
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2015) (Forster & Hader, 2016). In the research, they used five principle types of radical
groups which are nationalist separatists, social revolutionaries, religious fundamentalists,
nontraditional religious extremists, including “new religions”, and right-wing groups and
evaluated individual group’s behaviors and indicators to categorize into the five types of
radical groups (Hecht-Nielsen, 1988). Their research showed that groups that become
terrorist organizations have similar characteristics which are group ideology and goals;
experience with violence; authoritarian leadership and decision making; organizational
processes such as recruitment, training, and attrition; and group psychological processes
such as humiliation and need for revenge; and sense of threat and negative
characterization of the enemy (Post, Ruby and Shaw, 2011). Furthermore, Smith,
Damphousse, and Roberts did a similar study which categorizes terrorist groups and
incidents into three types of domestic terrorism; left wing, right wing, and single issue
(Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts, 2006). Their study found that terrorism involves people
or groups that are motivated by political or social goals, ideological justification, and
considerable forethought and planning (Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts, 2006). These
specific characteristics are what the authors identified as unique strategies and
characteristics of terrorist organizations compared to traditional criminality.
Studies by Post, Ruby, and Shaw and Smith, Damphousse and Roberts show that
terrorist organizations behave differently from traditional criminals. Studies also indicate
that terrorist organizations can be categorized by their behaviors, goals, and regions they
operate. Therefore, it is also possible to recognize the unique behaviors of unidentified
terrorist groups and make educated assumptions on which terrorist organization
conducted specific attacks using artificial neural networks.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter begins with exploratory analyses of the data used, then discusses the
use of the artificial neural network to classify unclaimed terror attacks within Pakistan. It
begins with a description of the variables used then continues with a discussion of the
construction of the model.
3.1. Artificial Neural Networks
The neural network changes the typical computing model. In classical computing,
we provide the computer with data and a set of rules, then the computer gives the answer.
However, neural networks change the computing paradigm; once data and the answers are
given to the neural network, it is left to “learn” the rules and patterns that connect the data
to the answers. Figure 3.1 indicates the workflow of a neural network: each element will
be discussed in detail.

Figure 3.1. Flowchart of Neural Network

21

Neural Networks take preprocessed data and use weights to assign value to the
various input variables. While artificial neural networks can accomplish tasks ranging from
machine vision to image recognition, this thesis uses the network to accomplish
multivariate classification (Hecht-Nielsen, 1988). The network takes in preprocessed data
ensuring the data is normalized to make the learning easier for the network. That is, the
data should have small values (ideally between 0, and 1) and be homogenous (have roughly
the same range) (Chollet & Allaire, 2018).
Once the data has been vectorized and normalized, it is ready to be fed through the
network. If we imagine the input data as a 2D matrix each input represents an entire row of
data. A batch is a defined number of rows that have been input into the network. Lastly, an
epoch represents the entire dataset of rows input into the network. For example, if there
are 10,000 rows in the dataset and the batch size is set to 512, a batch is 512 rows being
input and every 10,000 rows being input represents an epoch.
The next major pieces of the neural network are the layers and weights. These are
typically represented as nodes with associated weights as seen in the following figure:
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Figure 3.2. Example of a Node/Neuron

As seen in Figure 3.2, each node can have any number of inputs and any number of
outputs. The only limitations are the input layer which will have a number of nodes that
match the shape of the input and the output layer which will have a number of outputs that
match the number of classification options (the dependent variable). Each neuron has
associated with a weight for each incoming input and uses the weights, inputs, and an
activation function to produce an output to send to subsequent nodes. The weights are all
initialized by assigning them random values that are near 0. The activation functions are
determined based on the type of data and results the machine is looking for. For this paper,
the first two layers will use a rectifier function to produce outputs that represent the
greater value of 0 or the input times weight.
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Figure 3.3. Rectified Linear Unit Function
Source: Chollet & Allaire, 2018

The final output layer uses a SoftMax activation function. The SoftMax function
behaves like a logit function that has been generalized to produce a probability for each
classification option with the restriction that all the probabilities sum to 1. For example,
with classes labeled A, B, and C the SoftMax function may produce an output: A: 0.7, B: 0.1,
C: 0.2. These outputs can be thought of as the network’s confidence in each classification.
The largest value ends up being the prediction for that set of inputs.
The network then uses a Loss function to calculate the difference between the
predicted answer and the real answer. This is accomplished using stochastic gradient
descent, where the function looks at the slope of the plane created by the loss function and
tries to find the lowest point. This lowest point represents the least amount of difference
between predicted answers and real answers.
After each batch, the optimizer function takes the current loss value and adjusts all
the weights of the nodes in the network in an attempt to further minimize the loss score
during the next batch. This cycle of feeding data, calculating loss, and updating the weights
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of the nodes is how the neural network ‘learns’ across the epochs of training data. Figure
3.4 displays the full network representation for this thesis.

Figure 3.4. Structure of Hidden Layers

Once the model is finished being trained on the training data the test data is then
input into the network. The test data then calculates an accuracy score for the model which
represents the percentage of times the model was able to correctly predict the group that
claimed the attack. After obtaining this score, the model is then measured against the
validation set to benchmark the performance of this model. The model can then be finetuned as needed in order to increase the accuracy, however, each time the model should be
tested against the validation set to simulate ‘real world’ improvements to the model.
Finally, once the model is sufficiently trained and validated the unknown attacks are
then used as inputs to the model and the output will be the model’s predictions for each
unclaimed attack. In summary, the neural network takes the attribute data of each terrorist
attack in Pakistan and makes a prediction of the group name that is most likely to have
committed the attack.
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3.2. Data
The data used comes from the widely used Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
Although there are numerous definitions for terrorism the GTD defines terrorism as “the
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (START,
2018). Due to this definition the GTD uses three criteria for an event to be included in the
database: (1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social
goal, (2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some
other message to a larger audience than the immediate victims, (3) The action must be
outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (START, 2018).
Since the case study is primarily concerned with Pakistan, a subset of the GTD is
created to include only attacks that happened within Pakistan itself as coded by the GTD.
The following independent variables are then selected to represent the behavioral patterns
that different terrorist organizations within Pakistan exhibit. The following table indicates
the summary statistics for the non-categorical variables of the known and unknown
datasets.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics

3.2.1. Independent Variables
I chose year, latitude and longitude, attack type, weapon type, target type, number of
fatalities, presence of suicide bomber for independent variables. Below are the
explanations and reasons why I chose them as my independent variables.
3.2.1.1. Year. First, Year is a numeric variable that is a measurement of the year the event
took place. This variable controls for attacks that happen within group active periods. That
is, if a group was active from 1985 through 1993 the network will be unlikely to predict
that group to have committed an attack in 2016. When considering the year’s impact on the
reason’s attacks are claimed, it has an effect on each one. Each attack whether pursuing the
goal of intimidation, attribution, spoiling, outbidding, or provocation will have a temporal
aspect to it.
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3.2.1.2. Latitude and Longitude. Second, and third are latitude and longitude variables.
They are both numeric and represent the geocoded coordinates of the city where the attack
occurred. In order to keep as many data points in the dataset, for this thesis, the specificity
attribute of the coordinates is ignored. The specificity variable accounts for instances
where the exact coordinate is unknown and indicates which administrative level centroid
is used to code the event. The result of the specificity is approximations that will still be
useful for targeting information. These variables will control for the region of the country
the group tends to target. This will help the network identify groups that tend to target
specific regions in the country and is an important aspect of terrorist targeting decisions
(Drake, 1998). Similar to the year variable, the location variables play an important role in
furthering all goals because every attack will have a spatial component to it.
3.2.1.3. Attack Types. The fourth independent variable is the attack type. It’s a categorical
variable that represents the general method of attack for the event. The following options
are recorded based on a hierarchy where, in the case of multiple methods, the preceding
category will be recorded: Assassination, Hijacking, Kidnapping, Barricade Incident,
Bombing/Explosion, Armed Assault, Unarmed Assault, Facility/Infrastructure Attack, and
Unknown. This variable represents the preferred attack type of the groups with the
assumption that groups tend to focus on types of attacks that reflect the goals of the group.
The type of attack used speaks to the goals of the group. For example, when trying to
intimidate a more lethal attack type may be used while pursuing attrition a softer attack
type may be used. Further, when outbidding, there may be an increase in the violence of
the type of attack in order to show strength. When pursuing the goal of provocation, attack
type is less important.
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3.2.1.4. Weapons Type. The fifth independent variable is the categorical variable weapon
type. The variable records the main weapons used during the event. These categories are
Biological, Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, Firearms, Explosives, Fake Weapons,
Incendiary, Melee, Vehicle, Sabotage Equipment, Other, and Unknown. This variable is
intended to control for potential militancy of groups and holds the assumption that groups
tend to use the same equipment over multiple attacks. Additionally, weapon types reflect
how a group prefers to operate. For example, groups that prefer suicide attacks will have a
tendency towards explosives instead of knives. Additionally, as Palfy indicates, weapon
systems used by groups further a purpose. Groups will choose their weapon systems based
on whether they are looking for lethality or fear for example (Palfy, 2003). As such, the
weapon selection directly relates to the overall goals of the groups. Intimidation and
outbidding should indicate different weapon selections as opposed to provocation or
spoiling.
3.2.1.5. Target Type. The sixth independent variable is the target or victim type. It’s a
categorical variable that captures the general type of the target. The categories are
Business, Government (general), Police, Military, Abortion-Related, Airports and Aircraft,
Government (diplomatic), Educational Institution, Food or Water Supply, Journalists and
Media, Maritime, NGO, Other, Private Citizens and Property, Religious Figures/Institutions,
Telecommunication, Terrorists/Non-State Militias, Tourists, Transportation (other than
aviation), Unknown, Utilities, Violent Political Parties. The variable indicates the goals and
targeting priorities of the terrorist organizations as the assumption is that the groups will
continue to attack the same types of targets that fit their organizational narrative and goals.
This variable speaks loudest to the goals of provocation and intimidation where the groups
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would be targeting government, police, or military targets. Additionally, the target selection
furthers the goals of spoiling by specifically targeting the groups or institutions coming to
an agreement.
3.2.1.6. Number of Fatalities. Seventh, I use a numeric variable representing the number
of fatalities for the incident. This number includes all victims and attackers who died as a
direct result of the incident. This variable will control for the overall violence level of the
groups. The assumption is that violent groups will have larger numbers of fatalities
associated with their events and they will be involved in these violent events more often.
The number of fatalities relates to all goals. For instances of intimidation, provocation, and
outbidding a higher number of fatalities may seem appropriate. However, when pursuing
the goals of attrition or spoiling, lower fatalities may be more prudent to the group.
3.2.1.7. Presence of a Suicide Bomber. The eighth and last independent variable is a
binary variable that represents whether a suicide bomber was used in the event. This
controls for groups that are willing to use suicide bombers to further their goals. The
assumption for this variable is that not all groups need or are willing to use suicide
bombers in their attacks and will help specify certain groups. Suicide bombers would be
primarily used in pursuit of the goals of intimidation where the groups signal that they are
absolutely committed to the cause. Additionally, suicide bombers would be most likely
used to outbid opponents and to provoke extreme counter terror retaliations.
3.2.2. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is the categorical variable for the group name.
This represents the official name of the group as recorded in the GTD. Additionally, the GTD
dataset was further cleaned to remove events from the dataset that included generic group
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names that were not indicative of a professional group. Examples of coded group names
whose events were removed from the dataset are youths, militants, and Mob.
3.3. Exploratory Analysis
In this section, I present exploratory analyses of the dataset. The purpose of the
section is to see how the known data and unknown data resemble each other to show that
the distributions of the training dataset is appropriate to apply to the unknown test sets. In
this section, known data means the attacks that we know the perpetrator and unknown
data means the attacks that we do not know the perpetrator.

Figure 3.5. Attack Types

Figure 3.5 shows the attack types of known and unknown attacks. The left
represents the known data and the right represents the unknown data. These two graphs
resemble each other; both have a big number of Bombing/Explosion attacks followed by
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Armed Assault and Assassination. Facility/Infrastructure Attack, Hijacking, Hostage Taking,
Unarmed Assault, and Unknown have a relatively low frequency.

Figure 3.6. Number of Kills

Figure 3.6 shows the number of kills by known and unknown attacks. The dotted
line represents the known attacks, and the solid line represents the unknown attacks. As
we can see, the two lines almost overlap each other which means the training of known
data can be appropriately applied to unknown data.
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Figure 3.7. Locations of Attacks

Figure 3.7 represents the map of Pakistan with the places where attacks have
happened. The left map shows the known data and the right map shows the unknown data.
Though there are a lot more attacks represented in the unknown data, the regions where
the attacks happen are similar. Therefore, the training on the known data will not be
misleading to use to test the unknown data.
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Figure 3.8. Presence of Suicide Attacks

Figure 3.8 shows the frequency of suicide attacks when terrorist groups commit
attacks. Even though the number of suicide attacks are more than three times higher in the
unknown attacks, the frequency of suicide attacks and the patterns of the suicide attacks
are similar in both known and unknown datasets. Therefore, the known and unknown
datasets resemble each other.
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Figure 3.9. Target Type (Unknown Data)

Figure 3.9. and 3.10. show the target type of unknown and known datasets. Target
types represent the locations where the attacks happen. Both known and unknown data
have high frequencies of attacks against police and private citizens and properties. The
known data also has a high frequency in attacks against military. Therefore, both known
data and unknown data represent similar types of targets.
3.4. Processing Data and Creating the Model
Then the data is split into two sets: One where the attack has been attributed (has a
group name value), and a second where the group name variable is Unknown. This results
in a set of attributed attacks of 3,204 observations and unknown attacks of 10,891
observations.
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Figure 3.10. Target Type (Known Data)

The attributed dataset is then split into two different datasets using a 70/30 ratio
with the new datasets being the training set having 70 percent, and the test set having 30
percent of the observations. After splitting, the independent variables are then scaled to
make the learning easier for the machine. Additionally, the categorical variable for the
group name is turned into a numeric value and is then one hot encoded into a large matrix
of binary columns. For example, a three-value dataset of ‘TTP’, ‘MQM’, and ‘BLA’ will be
given the numbers 1, 2, and 3. Then, columns in the dataset are generated to represent the
binary categories of ‘isTTP’, ‘isMQM’ and ‘isBLA’ with a 1 representing true and 0 false.
The model is then initialized as a sequential model. First, an 8-node input layer is
added using the rectifier activation function. Two hidden layers are then added with 45
nodes each also using the rectifier activation function. The model then has a final output
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layer with 95 nodes using a softmax activation function. Next, the model is compiled using
a loss function of categorical cross entropy, the adam optimizer, and keeping a metric of
accuracy.
The model is then fit using the training data and runs for 50 epochs with a batch size
of 75. An epoch represents when every row in the dataset has been input into the network.
The batch size represents the number of rows of data that are processed before the weights
of the nodes are updated. The training dataset uses a validation split of .2 which represents
20 percent of the data are held back from the training data to be used in a validation test of
the model. The ratio of training and test sets are typical.
Once the model has finished fitting. The loss and accuracy values are determined for
both the training set and the validation set. Analyzing these numbers allows the
determination of whether the model is acceptable or not. When the model is acceptable it is
then fit on the remaining test set of data to get a measure of overall accuracy. Finally, the
model is then used to make predictions on the completely unknown dataset where the
network will assign a value to the likelihood of each dependent variable being correct for
each row. The group name with the highest value will be the selected output for the given
attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
This chapter will conduct an analysis of the training of the model followed by an
overall conclusion and highlight areas of improvement in the future. Figure 4.1 shows the
results from running the test and validation sets.

Figure 4.1. Top: Loss Score er Epoch; Bottom: Accuracy per Epoch

The results of the model training show a final loss value of 1.2033 and a validation
loss of 1.617. The accuracy of the model is indicated as 65% and a validation accuracy of
61%. The closeness of the accuracy and validation accuracy over time indicate slight over
fitting. Similarly, the validation plots stay relatively tight throughout the epoch with a slight
exception towards the end of training.
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Moving forward, future models can be improved by making a number of
adjustments. First, the independent variables can be expanded from their current values to
a deeper more nuanced version of the same variables according to the GTD. This has the
possibility to increase variation between the attack type, weapon type, and target type
variables between attacks resulting in potentially greater distinction between groups.
Additionally, secondary and tertiary variables could be used for the attack, weapon, and
target types. For example, using targtype2 or targtype3 for secondary and tertiary targets
respectively. Lastly, adjustments could possibly be made to the compilation of the model.
For example, the parameters of the model such as batch size, hidden layer depth, hidden
layer width, and weight initialization can be adjusted to facilitate the gradual learning of
the model over a longer period of time to prevent overfitting the training data. The impact
of these suggestions should increase the overall accuracy of the model so that it can then be
applied to unknown data with a greater degree of confidence.
To conclude, while the results of this neural network model achieved a 65%
accuracy rate after being trained, I believe it can be improved on. Achieving results better
than random chance indicates that the artificial neural networks can be used as a predictor
of unattributed attacks. However, the success of the method is highly dependent on the
model and the amount of data available. As such, this methodology may work better in
areas of the world with higher numbers of attacks and lower numbers of groups. Equally
plausible is that the methodology would likely perform worse in areas where there is little
data to train a model with.
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4.1. Limitations and Policy Implications of the Analysis
The major limitations of this study are the fact that the artificial neural networks
can only predict and we cannot be 100% sure about the predicted results. As the accuracy
of the model gets higher, the probability of the machine predicting the correct perpetrator
will also increase, but it will still remain as a “prediction” rather than “the answer.” Another
limitation related to this is the cases of lone wolf attacks, one-hit-wanders, ghost groups,
and imitation groups. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with this model whether the
perpetrators were one-time action-oriented groups like lone wolf attacks and one-hitwanders. Or, if the perpetrator groups were imitating certain famous and well-known
groups in their attack strategies, group behaviors, and others distinct characteristics, then
the machine will make a prediction of the original group that had more presence in
terrorism history.
This study can be used by any governments and groups that work for
counterterrorism. In this thesis, I show that machine learning can be used predict the
perpetrators of unclaimed, unattributed terrorist attacks. The accuracy of model is still
relatively low and will not be practical to be used yet, however, the accuracy is higher than
random guessing. Therefore, with modification of the model and improvement in data
collection, machine learning mechanism can be used to predict the perpetrators of
unknown attacks in the future.
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